The banking secrecy as defined by the Monetary and Financial Code does not protect your savings against payment fraud. It governs the confidentiality of the data held by the institution, not the operational security of your transactions. Confusing the two exposes blind spots that recent regulatory measures are beginning to address, particularly with the requirement for verification of the payee on SEPA transfers.
Verification of Payee: the IBAN-name check that changes the game
The European regulation on instant payments now requires payment service providers to verify the consistency between the payee’s name and the IBAN before validating a transfer. This obligation, already effective for instant SEPA transfers, will gradually extend to other transfers during the 2025-2027 period.
This mechanism fundamentally alters the fraud control model. The filter no longer focuses solely on the transaction itself (amount, frequency, geolocation), but on the consistency of the payee’s data upstream. In case of a discrepancy between the declared name and the one linked to the IBAN, the provider must alert the payer before execution.
For the customer, this verification is free. We observe that this measure reduces the risk of banking identity theft and data entry errors, two loss vectors that have previously gone under the radar of automated controls. The resources available on bankgeheimen.be detail the practical implications of these regulatory developments for account holders.
Payment fraud in Europe: an unfavorable trend despite measures
The joint EBA/ECB report published in December 2025 confirms an increase in reported losses related to payment fraud in 2024. Fraud by transfer and card is accelerating, indicating that existing security layers (strong authentication, 3D Secure) are no longer sufficient to contain the phenomenon.
This increase is partly explained by the sophistication of social engineering techniques. Classic phishing is giving way to more elaborate scenarios: phone calls impersonating the bank’s number, SMS reproducing the institution’s visual codes, fake advisors already possessing the client’s personal data.
Transfer fraud and card fraud: two distinct logics
Card fraud relies on the interception of data (skimming, compromise of merchant databases). Transfer fraud exploits trust: the customer initiates the operation themselves, often under psychological pressure. When the customer validates the operation themselves, the bank is not obliged to refund.
This distinction has direct consequences on the protection of the account holder. For an unauthorized card payment, the regulatory framework provides for a refund. For a transfer voluntarily initiated under manipulation, the burden of proof rests on the customer. We recommend systematically documenting any suspicious interaction before it leads to an operation.
Banking data security: beyond the password
The strength of a client area password remains a prerequisite, but it is no longer the critical link. Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) mandated by the Payment Services Directive requires at least two factors from three categories: knowledge, possession, inherence. Most banks use a combination of code + validation on a mobile application.
The weak point is rarely at the technical protocol level. It is at the user level who communicates their codes under pressure, or who validates a push notification without checking its content. Never validate a payment notification that you did not initiate remains the most effective and most ignored rule.
- Always check the amount and the payee displayed in the push notification before any validation, even for small amounts.
- Separate the email address used for your banking area from that of your commercial registrations to limit exposure to targeted phishing.
- Enable real-time alerts on every transaction, including direct debits: a fraudulent direct debit can go unnoticed for several weeks on a monthly statement.
Mobile payment and tokenization: isolating card data
Mobile payment never transmits the actual card number to the terminal. Tokenization replaces sensitive data with a one-time token, making interception unnecessary for a fraudster. This mechanism neutralizes skimming and the compromise of merchant databases.
However, mobile payment does not protect against manipulation fraud. If a scammer convinces you to validate a transfer or add their card to your e-wallet, tokenization does not come into play. The technology covers the security of the channel, not the human decision.
Single-use virtual cards: an underutilized complement
Several institutions offer the generation of ephemeral virtual cards for online purchases. Each card is associated with a limit and a restricted validity period. In the event of a merchant site compromise, the captured data becomes unusable.
This measure remains little adopted, even though it is probably the most effective way to secure online payments without changing purchasing habits. Most banking apps now integrate this feature, often at no extra cost.
Effective banking protection no longer relies on a single mechanism. Payee verification, tokenization, and virtual cards each cover a different fraud vector. The last link remains the behavior of the account holder in response to an unexpected solicitation: no technological layer compensates for a validation granted under pressure.